Do you need to comply with some external regulations (think PCI) that require your Microsoft Active Directory (AD) passwords to be changed frequently, yet you have an account that, if the password is changed, you think applications may stop working?
I am obviously not encouraging anyone to use the following quirky feature of AD to be dishonest with an auditor, but it is always interesting to find "fake" security features or at least features that can be manipulated in unexpected ways.
If you check the "User must change password at next logon" box on an account in Active Directory Users & Computers, it does something very interesting under the hood-- it deletes the value of the "PwdLastSet" attribute. The "PwdLastSet" attribute is a date-time representation, but the semantic behavior of AD when that field is empty (or zeroed out) is the equivalent to the force password change check box you may have seen thousands of times before and previously believed to be stored in AD as a boolean true/false value or something similar.
The really interesting behavior occurs when you uncheck the box. BEFORE the box is checked, there was an actual date stored in the "PwdLastSet" attribute. When the box was checked and the changes applied to the account, that date in "PwdLastSet" was lost forever. So, if you uncheck the box BEFORE the user account logs on and is forced to change, then what can the AD Users & Computers tool do? It has forever forgotten the true date for when the account's password was last set. So, the AD U&C developers did what any good developer would do: improvise.
So, in the bizarre situation where the force password change box is checked, applied, then unchecked, AD Users & Computers writes the current date-time into the "PwdLastSet" attribute, which has the unintended consequence of making the account look like the password was just changed.
Happy password policy circumventing!